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I. INTRODUCTION 
Awareness of tropical forests’ significance to climate change and 
other major environmental and social issues appears to be growing in 
the United States, receiving attention in the op-ed pages of The New 
York Times and Time magazine, for example.1  The role of tropical 
 
        †  This article was developed in conjunction with my participation in the 2010 
William Mitchell Law Review Symposium, “Carbon Management and the Law,” on 
January 14, 2010.  I am grateful to the editors for inviting me to participate and to 
Lauren Shaffar, Jeremey Dobbins, and Grant Shogren for excellent research 
assistance. 
 1. Thomas L. Friedman, Trucks, Trains and Trees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at 
A27; Bryan Walsh, 5 Things to Watch for at the Copenhagen Climate-Change Conference, 
TIME, Dec. 7, 2009,  http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/
0,28804,1929071_1929070_1945894,00.html.  
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2010] TROPICAL FORESTS 969 
forests in mitigating climate change has also received extensive 
attention in scientific and policy literature.2  It is one of several major 
issue areas considered critical in negotiating an agreement for 
international climate change regulation upon the expiration of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2012.3  Further, proposed U.S. federal climate 
legislation includes provisions that would allow significant use of 
carbon credits, generated from tropical forest mitigation projects, to 
play a key role in a U.S. compliance offset market.4   
Tropical forests provide many key services in addition to carbon 
storage, but remain essentially unprotected by international law.5  
Deforestation continues at an alarming rate despite two decades of 
concerted international efforts to combat it.6  Halting this devastation 
will not be simple, and it remains uncertain whether an international-
ly agreed upon forest carbon mechanism will have a significant effect.7  
At this point, it does not appear likely that international law will 
provide strong incentives for tropical mitigation projects to include, 
maintain, or enhance environmental or socioeconomic benefits of 
tropical forest ecosystems other than carbon storage.  Nevertheless, 
U.S. law can provide significant encouragement for development of 
projects that provide not only carbon offsets, but also significant co-
benefits such as biodiversity preservation or socioeconomic progress. 
If the U.S. Congress passes climate change legislation in the near 
future, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will likely be 
charged with establishing criteria for international carbon credits that 
may be used by U.S. entities to comply with statutory requirements.  
This article maintains that, upon enactment of such legislation, the 
EPA should establish qualifications for international forest mitigation 
project credits that will foster the growth of projects that broadly 
support the principles of sustainable development while producing 
carbon credits.  Further, the article provides a suggested framework 
for such regulations that will prioritize those projects with high 
 
 2. See, e.g., FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO), GLOBAL 
FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT 2005 – 15 KEY FINDINGS (2005) [hereinafter FAO, 
GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT]; INT’L UNION OF FOREST RESEARCH ORGS., 
ADAPTATION OF FORESTS AND PEOPLE TO CLIMATE CHANGE – A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT 
REPORT  (Risto Seppälä et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter INT’L UNION OF FOREST 
RESEARCH]; William F. Laurance, Can Carbon Trading Save Vanishing Forests?, 58 
BIOSCIENCE 286 (2008).    
 3. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 4. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B. 
 5. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 6. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 7. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
2
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environmental and socioeconomic value, thus directing U.S. private 
investment toward the forest mitigation projects with the greatest 
potential to have broad beneficial impacts on the regions in which 
they are developed. 
In Part II, the article provides a brief overview of the importance 
of tropical forests to addressing climate change.  Part III examines co-
benefit issues raised by the emerging international mechanism for 
supporting tropical mitigation projects.  In Part IV, the article turns to 
U.S. climate change policy, analyzes proposed federal climate change 
legislation as it relates to tropical forests, and suggests a regulatory 
approach to enhancing sustainable tropical forest protections 
through U.S. law.  Part V concludes. 
II. FORESTS & CARBON  
The earth contains an estimated four billion hectares of forest, 
which equates to approximately 30% of the planet’s land area.8  Of 
the total forest area, approximately one-third is primary forest.9  
Despite the apparent vastness of forest resources, deforestation and 
forest degradation are among the most intractable international 
environmental issues.10  After roughly two decades of efforts to create 
an international regime that will slow the devastation, deforestation 
continues at a rate of approximately thirteen million hectares per 
year11 with much of the loss occurring in the tropics.  In tropical dry 
forests, for example, roughly 15,400 square miles are cleared annual-
ly, with additional areas burned, selectively logged or harmed at the 
edges of clear-cuts.12  Most of the cleared or damaged areas “are left as 
almost useless land.”13 
Tropical forests, and especially primary tropical forests, provide 
extraordinary environmental value as biodiversity habitat, housing 
nearly two-thirds of all biodiversity of land-based ecosystems.14  These 
 
 8. FAO, GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 3.  
 9. Nonetheless, approximately six million hectares of primary forest are being 
lost each year, while plantation forests are growing.  Id. at 4.  Primary forests are 
forests that have not been logged in recent times.  Id.  
 10. E.g., PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 615 
(2d ed. 2003). 
 11. FAO, GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 3.   
 12. ERIC CHIVIAN & AARON BERNSTEIN, SUSTAINING LIFE:  HOW HUMAN HEALTH 
DEPENDS ON BIODIVERSITY 30 (2008).   
 13. Id. 
 14. William F. Laurance, Can Carbon Trading Save Vanishing Forests?, 58 
BIOSCIENCE 286 (2008). 
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forests also provide major ecosystem services of direct value to human 
populations, including food and medicines for indigenous popula-
tions and regulation of water and nutrients.15  Forest biodiversity and 
land cover are also relevant for adaptation to growing threats from a 
changing climate, such as drought.16   
Of central importance for climate policy, forests play a very signif-
icant role in the carbon cycle.  Currently, forests store nearly 638 
gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon, including nearly 283 Gt in forest biomass.17  
Deforestation causes approximately seventeen percent of global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions annually.18  In some countries, 
deforestation may account for ninety percent of annual GHG 
emissions.19  Deforestation also affects the global climate because 
intact primary tropical forests act as a carbon sink,20 drawing signifi-
cant amounts of GHG emissions out of the atmosphere.21  Further, 
tropical forests are particularly important for controlling emissions 
because they remove more carbon annually than higher latitude 
forests.22  Today’s forests, if left alone, could remove about ten 
percent of carbon dioxide emissions expected in the first half of the 
21st century.23   
Most of the forests threatened with deforestation and degrada-
tion, particularly tropical forests, are located in developing coun-
 
 15. INT’L UNION OF FOREST RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 16–17. 
 16. For example, intact forests will provide room for species to migrate as the 
climate in their current habitats change and potentially become unsuitable. 
 17. Charlotte Streck et al., Climate Change and Forestry: An Introduction, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND FORESTS 4 (Charlotte Streck et al. eds., 2008) (citing U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. 
ORG. , GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT 2005: PROGRESS TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE 
FOREST MANAGEMENT, in FAO FORESTRY PAPER 147, infra note 24, at 14).   
 18. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Valencia, Spain, Nov. 
12–17, 2007, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 5. 
 19. See, e.g., Johnson Nkem et al., Forests for Climate Change Adaptation in the Congo 
Basin:  Responding to an Urgent Need with Sustainable Practices, 2 CENTER FOR INT’L 
FORESTRY RES. ENVTL. BRIEF 1, 2 (2008), available at http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/
Knowledge/Publications/Detail?pid=2606.  
 20. Carbon sinks are processes or mechanisms that remove greenhouse gases or 
aerosols from the atmosphere.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change art. 1(8), May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
 21. Simon L. Lewis et al., Increasing Carbon Storage in Intact African Tropical Forests, 
457 NATURE 1003, 1003 (2009) (noting that “tropical forests . . . annually process 
approximately six times as much carbon via photosynthesis and respiration as humans 
emit from fossil fuel use”).  However, the tropical forests’ future capacity to absorb 
carbon remains uncertain.  Id. at 1006.   
 22. B. Britton Stephens et al., Weak Northern and Strong Tropical Land Carbon 
Uptake from Vertical Profiles of Atmospheric CO2, 316 SCI. 1732, 1732–35 (2007). 
 23. Streck et al., supra note 17, at 5 (citing IPCC, LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE, 
AND FORESTRY: A SPECIAL REPORT OF THE IPCC (2000)). 
4
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tries.24  Brazil has the most extensive primary forest cover of any 
nation on earth and also lost more primary forest cover than any 
other nation in the period 2000–2005.25  Brazil’s conversion of nearly 
3.1 million hectares of primary forest more than doubled the extent 
of primary deforestation in Indonesia,26 which had the second most 
extensive primary deforestation in the same period and has the eighth 
largest forest area.27  Total emissions from deforestation in these two 
countries will likely more than double all Annex I reductions under 
the Kyoto Protocol.28  Yet all major tropical forest regions include 
countries that rank among the highest rates of deforestation.29  Given 
the role of forests in providing a wealth of ecosystem services, 
extensive loss of forests triggers much broader environmental and 
socioeconomic harms in many instances.   
Deforestation is driven primarily by economics, based largely on 
the value of the products that can be produced on the land (includ-
ing timber and agricultural products for the international market) or 
the subsistence needs of local peoples.30  While the uses of lands 
occupied by forests have market value, ecosystem services such as 
water purification and the prevention of soil erosion generally do 
not.31  Nevertheless, the drivers of deforestation are highly complex 
 
 24. See FAO, FAO FORESTRY PAPER 147: GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT 
2005: PROGRESS TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT xv (2006) [hereinafter 
FAO FORESTRY PAPER 147]. 
 25. Id. at 21.  FAO data depends upon country reporting and is incomplete 
because several significant tropical forest nations do not report. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at xiii. 
 28. See, e.g., Sergio Jauregui, International Forest Policy and Options for Climate 
Change Forest Policy in Developing Countries, in FORESTRY & CLIMATE CHANGE 184–90 
(Peter H. Freer-Smith et al. eds., 2007). 
 29. FAO FORESTRY PAPER 147, supra note 24, at 233. 
 30. See, e.g., GHAZAL BADIOZAMANI ET AL., DRIVERS OF DEFORESTATION AND FOREST 
DEGRADATION IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 10, available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/
22692296/Drivers-of-Deforestation-and-Forest-Degradation-Implications-for.html. 
Similar forces drive forest degradation, which produces significant negative effects 
similar to deforestation and can, in some instances, be a precursor to deforestation.  
SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, CONNECTING BIODIVERSITY 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION: REPORT OF THE SECOND AD HOC 
TECHNICAL EXPERT GROUP ON BIODIVERSITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 56, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-41-en.pdf.  FAO estimates degradation 
of six million hectares of primary forest per year and further degradation occurs in an 
increasing percentage of secondary forests.  Levin, infra note 32, at 540–41. 
 31. Cf. Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural 
Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 253 (1987) (noting that “[b]ecause [ecosystem] services are 
not fully captured in markets or adequately quantified in terms comparable with 
economic services and manufactured capital, they are often given too little weight in 
5
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and one cannot assume that attaching financial value to forest carbon 
alone will overcome socioeconomic issues that have stymied three 
decades of efforts to regulate forest management directly.32  Instead, 
overcoming deforestation will often require deep changes to socioe-
conomic circumstances in and around a forest area. 
III. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FOREST CARBON: REDD 
A. International Context: Existing Framework & The Promise of REDD 
There is no effective global regime for slowing deforestation de-
spite decades of institutionalized international efforts to improve 
tropical forest management.33  The relevance of deforestation to 
climate change has been recognized for decades, but efforts to 
include appropriate mechanisms in climate change agreements have 
thus far failed.  The current international climate regime under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) has, at best, very minimal impact on global forest 
resources.34  Under the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, Annex I 
countries (i.e., developed countries that have adopted emissions 
reductions targets) are permitted to invest in afforestation or 
reforestation activities in developing countries as a means of meeting 
up to one percent of their Kyoto Protocol reductions targets through 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).35  Perhaps more 
importantly from a forestry perspective, the existing definition of 
“forests” under the climate regime may serve to discourage sustaina-
 
policy decisions”). 
 32. See Kelly Levin et al., The Climate Regime as Global Forest Governance: Can 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Initiatives Pass a ‘Dual 
Effectiveness’ Test?, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 538, 541 (2008); see also BADIOZAMANI ET AL., 
supra note 30, at 11. 
 33. For an example of these efforts, see United Nations Forum on Forests, 
About UNFF, History and Milestones of International Forest Policy, 
http://www.un.org/esa/forests/about-history.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
 34. See, e.g., Andrew Long, Taking Adaptation Value Seriously: Designing REDD to 
Protect Biodiversity, 3 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 314, 317–18 (2009) (discussing 
shortcomings of the Clean Development Mechanism’s approach to forests).   
 35.  Conference of the Framework Convention on Climate Change on its 7th 
Session, Marrakesh, Morocco, Nov. 10, 2001, Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
Activities (Under the Kyoto Protocol), Decision 11/CP.7, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/cop7/13a01.pdf#page=54 [hereinafter Definitions, Modalities, and Rules].  For 
a discussion of the CDM, see generally FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME: A GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
PROCEDURES 159–87 (2004).   
6
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ble forest management practices.  Forests are defined as: “a minimum 
area of land of 0.05–1.0 hectares with tree crown cover (or equivalent 
stocking level) of more than 10–30[%] with trees with the potential to 
reach a minimum height of 2–5 metres at maturity in situ.”36  There is 
presently no mechanism in the current climate regime to incentivize 
preservation of standing primary forests.  Accordingly, the CDM of 
the Kyoto Protocol has frequently been criticized as creating perverse 
incentives that could undermine preservation of primary tropical 
forests.37 
The idea of a mechanism to create carbon credits from standing 
tropical forests was raised in UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol negotia-
tions beginning in the early 1990s, but technical difficulties in 
measuring and verifying carbon in—and emissions from—forests 
prevented their adoption, as did developing country concerns 
regarding sovereignty over natural resources.38  Recent technical 
progress has “to some extent, cleared the way for negotiators to move 
on to the more political and institutional challenges”39 involved in 
creating a mechanism for primary tropical forest preservation.40   
Such a mechanism, known as “reducing emissions from defore-
station and degradation” (REDD), is very likely to enter the global 
climate regime, particularly if a new multilateral climate agreement is 
adopted.41  REDD was first raised in a form roughly equivalent to 
 
 36. See Definitions, Modalities, and Rules, supra note 35, at 58; see also YAMIN & 
DEPLEDGE, supra note 35, at 124–25; Michael Totten et al., Biodiversity, Climate, and the 
Kyoto Protocol: Risks and Opportunities, 1 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND THE ENV’T 264 
(2003). 
 37. E.g., Ernst-Detlef Schulze et al., Making Deforestation Pay Under the Kyoto 
Protocol?, 299 SCIENCE 1669 (2003). 
 38. See ERIN C. MYERS MADEIRA, POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM 
DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION (REDD) IN TROPICAL FORESTS 26 (Adrienne 
Foerster & Sally Atwater eds., Resources for the Future 2008).  “In 1997 . . . the 
Parties to the [Kyoto] Protocol excluded REDD from the offset mechanism because 
of uncertainties about the magnitude of deforestation emissions and the ability to 
monitor deforestation.”  Id. at 9; Doris Fuchs, Global Governance: An International 
Relations Perspective on Tropical Forests, in TROPICAL DEFORESTATION: EXPLORING 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES 133 (Sharon L. Spray & Matthew D. Moran eds., 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 
 39. CHARLOTTE STRECK ET AL., REDD+ INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS ASSESSMENT 3 
(2009). 
 40. Id.  “Current negotiations focus on the need for appropriate and predictable 
financial support for REDD+ and other mitigation actions, the establishment of new 
(or reformed) funding mechanisms, and structuring the access to these funds by 
developing countries.”  Id. 
 41. See id. (stating that, given the progress made thus far, it would be reasonable 
to expect a Copenhagen agreement on REDD+ to include the objectives, scope, and 
principles of REDD+ in a treaty instrument). 
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current proposals at the eleventh session of the Conference of Parties 
to the UNFCCC (COP 11) in 2005 by Costa Rica and Papua New 
Guinea, which led the Coalition of Rainforest Nations in offering a 
joint proposal for reducing emissions from deforestation.42  Since the 
inception of REDD negotiations, proponents have argued that REDD 
could provide an economic incentive to prevent deforestation in 
developing countries43 and reduce overall costs of mitigation.44  
Carbon credits created through a REDD mechanism could frequently 
be sold at a lower cost than reducing fossil fuel emissions in devel-
oped countries,45 while credit sales would often generate income for 
host nations that is significantly greater than opportunity costs of 
avoiding deforestation.46 
REDD received a strong endorsement at COP 13 in Bali, where 
the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) reported favorably on the potential for creating a REDD 
mechanism.47 As a part of the “Bali Roadmap,” the COP identified 
COP 15 in Copenhagen as the target date for designing a REDD 
mechanism.48  Specifically, the Bali Action Plan calls for “[P]olicy 
 
 42. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Montreal, 
Canada, Nov. 28–Dec. 9, 2005, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing 
Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1 (Nov. 11, 
2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/misc01.pdf; see 
also STRECK ET AL., supra note 39, at 6–7 (explaining how the proposal by Costa Rica 
and Papua New Guinea was incorporated into the Bali Action Plan at COP-13).  
 43. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Montreal, 
Canada, Nov. 28–Dec. 9, 2005, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing 
Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action, at 4, 9, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1 
(Nov. 11, 2005) (noting that “the carbon emissions markets can monetize environ-
mental resources and capitalize sustainable development”), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/misc01.pdf.   
 44. MYERS MADEIRA, supra note 38, at 27. 
 45. Georg Kindermann et al., Global Cost Estimates of Reducing Carbon Emissions 
Through Avoided Deforestation, 105 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 
July 29, 2008, at 10305, available at http://climatelab.org/@api/deki/files/337/
=Cost_estimates_of_AD_by_best_modelers.pdf. 
 46. See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 
244–45 (2007). 
 47. See STRECK ET AL, supra note 39, at 6–7 (noting the advanced status of REDD+ 
negotiations at the COP 13 in Bali); United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Bali, Dec. 3–15, 2007, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at its Thirteenth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008), at 
12 (noting the progress made by the SBSTA in advancing and implementing the 
technical framework for a REDD mechanism). 
 48. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Dec. 3–15, 
2007, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) at 31, ¶ 5. 
8
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approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of 
forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries . . . .”49  The concept of REDD embraced in Bali is often 
referred to as “REDD+” because of its emphasis on conservation, 
sustainable management, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.50   
The potential for REDD to realize “co-benefits” has become an 
increasingly important topic in the REDD debate, as reflected by both 
country proposals and support from the international community.51  
“Co-benefits” are, essentially, any benefits beyond mitigation.52  These 
include benefits for biodiversity, maintenance of ecosystem services, 
and a variety of potential socio-economic benefits (such as governance 
improvements and poverty alleviation) related to REDD projects.53   
Despite increasing discussion of “REDD+” and “co-benefits,” the 
core goal of REDD remains mitigation.54  The potential importance of 
REDD to mitigation goals is highlighted by a recent United Nations 
Environment Programme–sponsored study on the eve of COP 15 
urging that robust measures to reduce emissions from deforestation 
 
 49. Id. at 3. 
 50. See, e.g., STRECK ET AL, supra note 39, at 30.   
 51. E.g., KATIA KAROUSAKIS, PROMOTING BIODIVERSITY CO-BENEFITS IN REDD, 
OECD ENVIRONMENT WORKING PAPERS NO. 11, at 3 (2009) (noting how a well-designed 
REDD mechanism can have substantial biodiversity co-benefits, and proposing ideas 
for enhancing these co-benefits), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
33/42/44164572.pdf; Long, supra note 34, at 314 (urging for a potential REDD 
mechanism to include specific incentives for biodiversity-enhancing projects). See 
generally CHARLIE PARKER ET AL., THE LITTLE REDD+ BOOK: A GUIDE TO GOVERNMENTAL 
AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL PROPOSALS FOR REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION 
AND DEGRADATION (2009), available at http://www.globalcanopy.org/themedia/file/
PDFs/LRB_lowres/lrb_en.pdf (discussing how the implementation of REDD will 
maximize co-benefits in the forest areas of developing countries). 
 52. REALISING REDD+: NATIONAL STRATEGY AND POLICY OPTIONS 312 (Arild 
Angelsen et al. eds., Center for International Forestry Research 2009), available at 
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/knowledge/publications/detail?pid=2871.   
 53. Id. at 5 (“There are at least four types of co-benefits to consider.  First, forest 
conservation, in addition to storing carbon, provides other environmental services, 
such as preserving biodiversity.  Second, REDD+ actions (e.g., financial flows) and 
forest conservation might have socio-economic benefits, such as reducing poverty, 
supporting livelihoods and stimulating economic development.  Third, REDD+ 
actions may spark political change toward better governance, less corruption, and 
more respect for the rights of vulnerable groups.  Fourth, REDD+ actions and forest 
conservation could boost the capacity of both forests and humans to adapt to climate 
change.”). 
 54. See STRECK ET AL, supra note 39, at 1 (referring to REDD+ as an action 
undertaken to mitigate climate change).  
9
Long: Tropical Forest Mitigation Projects and Sustainable Development:
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
 
2010] TROPICAL FORESTS 977 
can play an important role in bridging the gap between pre–COP 15 
country pledges and the reductions necessary to limit climate change 
to two degrees Celsius by 2100.55  Indeed, in the lead-up to COP 15, 
REDD+ was widely regarded as a core element of any deal that might 
emerge.56  However, COP 15 resulted only in a basic COP decision on 
REDD+ methodological issues57 and a draft working group decision 
on REDD+ policy.58  Importantly, the draft agreement on policy 
recognized the significance of co-benefits,59 but provided only 
minimal incentives or protections for them.60  For example, the draft 
includes language to “affirm” that safeguards should be supported or 
promoted, including,  
Actions that are consistent with the conservation of natural 
forests and biological diversity, ensuring that [REDD+ activi-
ties] are not used for the conversion of natural forests, but 
are instead used to incentivize the protection and conserva-
tion of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to 
enhance other social and environmental benefits.61 
Currently, a number of demonstration projects are underway to 
prove the viability of REDD+ in reducing emissions and, in many 
instances, provide co-benefits.62  These projects are sponsored by 
several international institutions, such as the Forest Carbon Partner-
ship Fund within the World Bank’s Carbon Finance Unit and the UN-
 
 55. NICHOLAS STERN ET AL., ACTION AND AMBITION FOR A GLOBAL DEAL IN 
COPENHAGEN (2009) (“Filling the remaining 2 Gt gap would require greater ambition 
. . . and greater efforts on REDD.”). 
 56. For an example of media reporting of this perception, see Bryan Walsh, On 
the Copenhagen Agenda, Saving Forests May Still Work, TIME, Nov. 15, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1929071_1929070_
1939675,00.html. 
 57. Climate Change Conference, Copenhagen,  Dec. 7–18, 2009,  Methodological 
Guidance for Activities Relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation and the Role of Conservation,  Sustainable Management of Forests and 
Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries, Draft Decision, -/CP.15 (2009) 
(advanced unedited version).   
 58. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen,  
Dec. 7–18, 2009, Policy Approaches and Positive Incentives on Issues Relating to Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries; and the Role of 
Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in 
Developing Countries, Draft Decision (addendum),  -/CP.15 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
 59. Id. at 2–3. 
 60. Id. at 4. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See UNFCCC, Demonstration Activities, http://unfccc.int/methods_science/
redd/demonstration_activities/items/4536.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (providing 
information about current demonstration projects seeking to prove the viability of 
REDD). 
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REDD program.63  Perhaps the most studied REDD project is the Noel 
Kempff Climate Action Project (NKCAP), started in 1997 for the 
Bolivian Government by a local non-governmental organization and 
the American NGO The Nature Conservancy, with funding from 
American Electric Power Company, BP America, and PacifiCorp.64  
NKCAP seeks to reduce deforestation by extension of a pre-existing 
protected area in northeastern Bolivia.65  The project was certified for 
verified emissions reductions of 1,034,107 metric tons of CO2 by 
2005.66   
Although demonstration projects are showing the potential for 
REDD+, they do not necessarily illustrate the likely impacts of a 
REDD+ mechanism that provides fungible offset credits in a regulato-
ry market.67  Indeed, some forest carbon offset projects show the 
potential for “carbon farming” in a way that undermines forest value 
to local populations by promoting plantation forests at the expense of 
primary forests.68  This concern will almost certainly become more 
prominent in a regulatory market—where buyers seek low-cost offsets 
for business reasons, rather than providing philanthropic support to 
sustainable development projects—and should be taken into account 
in design of REDD+.69  Even if the international rules for REDD+ do 
not adequately address the need to promote sustainable projects, 
however, individual countries can influence the shape of REDD+ 
through domestic climate change laws defining the type of credits 
that qualify as emissions offsets.  Thus, as the United States moves 
toward comprehensive federal climate change legislation, lawmakers 
should incorporate measures to promote sustainable development 
goals in forest carbon offset credit generation. 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. LAURA XIMENA RUBIO ALVARADO & SHEILA WERTZ-KANOUNNIKOFF, WHY ARE WE 
SEEING ‘REDD?’ AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON REDUCING EMISSIONS 
FROM DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13 (2007).   
 65. Id.; Jörg Seifert-Granzin, Case Study: The Noel Kempff Climate Action Project, 
Bolivia, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET 
OPPORTUNITIES 223, 223 (Streck et al. eds. 2008). 
 66. Id. at 224. 
 67. See Long, supra note 34, at 319. 
 68. See, e.g., Claudia M. Stickler et al., The Potential Ecological Costs and Cobenefits of 
REDD: A Critical Review and Case Study From the Amazon Region, GLOBAL CHANGE 
BIOLOGY 2803, 2806 (2009) (“[T]he species rich cerrado woodlands and savannas of 
Brazil are already being replaced by plantations of Eucalyptus species, native to 
Australia, and at least one project to earn carbon credits from this process is already 
underway.”). 
 69. See Long, supra note 34, at 323. 
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B. Challenges of Implementation and Opportunities for Co-Benefits 
Beyond the broad design issues relating to creation of an effec-
tive carbon market mechanism, there are very difficult issues relating 
to implementation that must be addressed.  These include issues that 
have long stymied efforts to create an effective international regime 
for forest protection, as well as complexities arising from the likely 
impacts of a carbon market.   
The preceding sections have discussed forests purely from a car-
bon reduction perspective.  As we turn to implementation and 
difficulties arising from issues on the ground in tropical forest 
nations, however, the intersection of carbon management with other 
environmental issues becomes critical.  REDD+ design must include 
not only carbon reduction maximization considerations, but also the 
intersection between carbon reduction and other ecological and 
social issues.  Thus, REDD+ implementation should be such that it 
advances sustainable development—a holistic approach that includes 
distributional and intergenerational considerations regarding the full 
scope of environmental and socioeconomic impacts of REDD+ 
implementation.   
1. Challenges of Implementation 
A range of environmental issues may be affected by the imple-
mentation of REDD+.  Two of the most important are biodiversity 
preservation and freshwater availability.  Tropical forests are among 
the most biodiverse ecosystems on the planet and house an extraordi-
nary number of endemic species.  Likewise, tropical forests provide 
water purification and hydrologic regulatory services that would be 
extremely expensive, if not impossible, to replicate.  The promise of 
increased forest preservation through REDD+ offers the most exciting 
opportunity in decades to promote sustainable development in these 
issue areas.  On the other hand, a poorly designed REDD mechanism 
could pose a significant risk of increasing pressures already leading to 
ecological and humanitarian crises.70  This pressure may come in the 
form of increased deforestation in those areas that do not participate.  
More broadly, certain forms of REDD may present incentives to 
concentrate on increasing forest cover through plantation forests that 
offer far less environmental value than primary forests.  In some 
instances, the increased pressure may fall upon forests of very high 
 
 70. E.g., Long, supra note 34, at 321–22. 
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environmental value because they often do not line up with high 
carbon value forests.71  
A variety of socioeconomic issues will also affect and be affected 
by REDD implementation.  While a REDD “mechanism could create a 
tremendous opportunity to bring a huge amount of money into the 
protection of forests that never existed before through traditional 
bilateral movement of funds,” it may also negatively impact “the 
sovereignty and the rights of local populations with access to the 
forest” by “lock[ing] up forests for the use and economic develop-
ment of local communities.”72  In addition, “[a]t the scale of regional 
and global economies, REDD could reduce the availability of land for 
agricultural expansion, [thus] pushing food prices higher,” which 
would negatively affect those already facing difficulty securing 
sufficient food.73   
Thus, realizing the promise of REDD+ co-benefits will require 
careful implementation that gives attention to more than simply the 
carbon stored in the forest.  A successful REDD+ program will be one 
that accounts for and beneficially impacts the inter-related environ-
mental services of forests while ensuring that the financial and 
environmental benefits of the projects flow to the communities who 
live in and around the forest. 
2. Approaches to Achieving Sustainability 
REDD+’s value for environmental and socioeconomic benefits 
will depend on project design.  A recent comparative case study of 
REDD+ project design in Brazil highlights the value of designing 
projects specifically for ecological benefits.74  The study found that an 
integrated REDD+ project including “severe restrictions . . . on 
agricultural and pasture expansion on private lands” achieved 
significantly greater carbon and ecological benefits than a similar 
 
 71. Stickler, supra note 68 at 2803–24; see also Marcus G. Sangster & Mike Dudley, 
Governance and Climate Change, in FORESTRY & CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 28, at 215; 
and Johannes Ebeling & Maï Yasué, Generating Carbon Finance Through Avoided 
Deforestation and its Potential to Create Climatic, Conservation and Human Development 
Benefits, 363 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. 1917, 1921–22 (2007) available at 
http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/363/1498/1917.full.pdf. 
 72. Brian Murray, Economics and the Climate Change Mitigation Portfolio, 29 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 39, 51 (2009); see also SIMONE LOVERA, THE HOTTEST REDD 
ISSUES: RIGHTS, EQUITY, DEVELOPMENT, DEFORESTATION AND GOVERNANCE BY 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 11, http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2009/smsn/ngo/117.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
 73. Stickler et al., supra note 68, at 2806.  
 74. See id. 
13
Long: Tropical Forest Mitigation Projects and Sustainable Development:
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
 
2010] TROPICAL FORESTS 981 
project that relied primarily on indigenous territories and lands with 
existing protective restrictions, which was much closer to the majority 
of REDD+ projects being developed in the region.75 Thus, the study 
concluded that 
[i]f well executed, the potential ecological co-benefits of 
REDD are numerous, and could improve water and air qual-
ity and wild game for low-income, rural populations. The 
protection of water resources, local and regional climate, 
soil resources, and biodiversity could contribute to the social 
benefits derived from REDD since they are ecosystem servic-
es on which local and regional populations depend . . . . 
Through the provision of ecosystem services provided direct-
ly and indirectly by conservation of forests, REDD could play 
an important role in maintaining or improving the quality of 
life of forest dependent communities [during climate 
change].76 
As the study illustrates, ecologically sensitive REDD+ implementa-
tion can be expected to increase the ecological value of projects and, 
in many cases, provide direct benefits to local communities.77   
There are several possible approaches to increasing the co-
benefits of REDD+.  Specific ecological standards could be developed 
at the international level,78 but this appears unlikely to occur through 
negotiations in the climate regime.  Further, it is not clear whether 
such an approach is desirable because increasing the scope of REDD+ 
requirements significantly beyond mitigation concerns may have the 
effect of reducing participation as some countries may view such 
requirements as overly intrusive or costly.79   
Another approach that is gaining ground in the voluntary mar-
kets would rely on certification.80  Several certification protocols have 
been developed for the voluntary forest carbon market,81 including 
one that places an emphasis on the impacts of REDD+ projects on 
biodiversity and socioeconomic issues—the Climate, Community and 
 
 75. Id. at 2816. 
 76. Id. at 2818.  
 77. Id. at 2804, 2812, 2818. 
 78. See Oscar Venter et al., Harnessing Carbon Payments to Protect Biodiversity, 326 
SCIENCE 1368 (2009). 
 79. See, e.g., Sangster & Dudley, supra note 71, at 217. 
 80. E.g., Stickler et al., supra note 68, at 2818. 
 81. See, e.g., EDUARD MERGER, FORESTRY CARBON STANDARDS 2008, A COMPARISON 
OF THE LEADING STANDARDS IN THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKET AND THE STATE OF 
CLIMATE FORESTATION PROJECTS (2008), http://www.carbonpositive.net/fetchfile.aspx
?FileID=133. 
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Biodiversity Alliance (CCB).82  The CCB Standards are designed 
primarily for the voluntary carbon market and include fourteen 
required standards addressing general matters, climate impact, 
community impact, and biodiversity impact.83  In addition, CCB 
provides three optional standards for “Gold Level” certification.  For 
the three substantive areas, CCB requires “net positive impact.”84  In 
addition, each substantive section includes a standard for offsite 
impacts designed to ensure projects do not have negative impacts 
outside the project areas.85  Finally, each substantive section includes 
monitoring requirements.  CCB certification is valid for five years and 
requires a re-audit to renew the certification.86  
CCB “Gold Level” certification includes standards for exception-
al community and biodiversity benefits and for adaptation benefits.  
The exceptional community benefits standard will recognize projects 
“targeting benefits to globally poorer communities and the poorer, 
more vulnerable households and individuals within them.”87  It 
requires, inter alia, that projects: 
1.  Demonstrate that the project zone is in a low human 
development country OR in an administrative area of a 
medium or high human development country in which 
at least 50% of the population of that area is below the 
national poverty line. 
2.  Demonstrate that at least 50% of households within the 
lowest category of well-being (e.g., poorest quartile) of 
the community are likely to benefit substantially from the 
project. 
. . . 
5.  Demonstrate that community impact monitoring will be 
able to identify positive and negative impacts on poorer 
and more vulnerable groups.88 
The standard for exceptional biodiversity benefit “identifies 
 
 82. Other well-developed certification systems include the Voluntary Carbon 
Standard (VCS) standards, the Plan Vivo System and Standards, and the CarbonFix 
Standard.  See generally id. 
 83. CHARLES EHRHART ET AL., THE CLIMATE, CMTY. & BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, 
CLIMATE, COMMUNITY & BIODIVERSITY PROJECT DESIGN STANDARDS 8 (2d ed. 2008), 
http://www.climate-standards.org/standards/pdf/ccb_standards_second_edition_
december_2008.pdf  
 84. Id. at 22, 25, 28. 
 85. Id. at 30. 
 86. Id. at 8. 
 87. Id. at 34 (alteration in original). 
 88. Id. 
15
Long: Tropical Forest Mitigation Projects and Sustainable Development:
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
 
2010] TROPICAL FORESTS 983 
projects that conserve biodiversity at sites of global significance for 
biodiversity conservation.”89  The indicators require demonstration 
that the site is in an important biodiversity area based on the vulnera-
bility or irreplaceability of the biodiversity.  CCB identifies the 
following types of activities that could qualify as providing adaptation 
benefits: “diversifying revenues and livelihood strategies; maintaining 
valuable ecosystem services such as hydrological regulation, pollina-
tion, pest control and soil fertility; and increasing habitat connectivity 
across a range of habitat and climate types.”90  The indicators require 
the project proponents to identify expected climate change impacts 
and demonstrate how “the project activities will assist communities 
and/or biodiversity to adapt to the probable impacts of climate 
change.”91   
CCB is also developing draft principles and criteria for applica-
tion in a regulatory market-based REDD+ program under the climate 
regime.  These principles and criteria are intended to support efforts 
“to design and implement REDD+ and other forest carbon programs 
that respect the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities 
and generate significant social and biodiversity co-benefits.”92  Eight 
principles cover issues such as benefit-sharing, long-term livelihood 
security and well-being of vulnerable populations, governance, 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, and stakeholder participation and 
access to information.93  Within each principle are several criteria that 
provide specific content for verification (which is usually further 
elaborated in indicators for each criterion).94  This framework 
essentially mirrors the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) approach to 
forest certification auditing, which has had a significant and generally 
successful track record of over fifteen years.95   
Certification along the lines of the CCB protocols offers a means 
 
 89. Id. at 35. 
 90. Id. at 32. 
 91. Id. at 33. 
 92. CCB, REDD+ SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: DRAFT PRINCIPLES AND 
CRITERIA, 9TH DECEMBER 2009, 1 (2009) http://www.climate-
standards.org/REDD+/docs/REDD+SE_Standards_PC_12_09_09.pdf [hereinafter 
CCB PRINCIPLES]. 
 93. Id. at 2–4.  
 94. Id.  
 95. See Forest Stewardship Council, http://www.fsc.org/types-of-certification.html 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (scroll to the frequently asked questions section for 
information detailing the audit procedures under the question of “How does FSC 
control its certification bodies?”).  Extensive information about the Forest Steward-
ship Council is available online at http://www.fsc.org/. 
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of identifying forest mitigation projects with features that advance 
sustainable development and biodiversity protection.96  Similar 
identification might be made through certification of projects by FSC, 
which has a longer track record and firmly established networks in 
many tropical forest nations.97  Further, if a stronger demand were 
present, it is likely that additional certification entities would arise to 
provide buyers the ability to compare overall ecological and social 
value of forest mitigation projects.98 
Certification, therefore, may provide a critical step toward en-
couraging sustainability-oriented REDD+ projects, particularly if a 
global regime provides REDD+ project hosts access to a global 
regulatory market.  The other element required for encouraging 
sustainable projects is the presence of significant sustainability-focused 
buyers.  It is here that the United States, through domestic legal 
requirements, could play an important role in promoting a form of 
REDD+ that advances sustainable development. 
IV. UNITED STATES LAW & TROPICAL FOREST OFFSETS: MOVING 
TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
The United States can encourage REDD+ design and implemen-
tation to advance sustainable development in two ways.  First, the 
United States can use its leverage at the negotiating table to push for 
REDD+ that ensures co-benefits such as biodiversity preservation and 
sustainable livelihoods.  The second approach, which is the subject of 
the remainder of this article, would rely on the design of U.S. law to 
promote a form of REDD+ that embraces sustainable development 
principles.   
A. U.S. Federal Proposals 
The two legislative proposals containing cap-and-trade regimes 
that have made the most progress in the U.S. Congress are the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (the Waxman-
Markey bill) in the House, passed on June 26, 2009,99 and the Clean 
 
 96. CCB PRINCIPLES, supra note 92, at 1.   
 97. See Forest Stewardship Council, http://www.fsc.org/fsc-locations.html (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2010) (providing locations worldwide of FSC certification projects 
already established).   
 98.  Some commentators have suggested that linking REDD+ with a payment for 
ecosystem services system (or with funders of such systems) could generate additional 
benefit.  See, e.g., Ebling & Yasué, supra note 71, at 1922–23.   
 99. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
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Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009 (the Kerry-Boxer bill), 
which passed out of the Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee.100  Both bills identify and cover seven greenhouse gases 
derived from stationary sources with annual emissions over 25,000 
tons, producers and importers of petroleum, distributors of natural 
gas, and other large sources.101  This is expected to cover about 85% of 
the United States’ greenhouse gas emissions.102  The Senate bill sets a 
20% reduction target for covered sources from 2005 levels by 2020,103 
while the House bill sets a 17% target.104  Other targets, however, 
parallel one another: a 3% reduction from 2005 levels by 2012, a 42% 
reduction by 2030, and an 83% reduction by 2050.105  Thus, both bills 
would reduce total U.S. emissions from approximately seven billion 
tons at present to under two billion tons by 2050.106 
Both bills establish a cap-and-trade system.  Under the Waxman-
Markey bill, up to two billion tons of offsets would be available for use 
system-wide, with one billion coming from domestic sources and one 
billion derived from international sources.107  Waxman-Markey would 
permit the EPA to increase the international limit to up to 1.5 billion 
 
(2009. 
 100. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009); see 
also PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE ACTION IN CONGRESS, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_congress (last visited Apr. 2, 
2010). 
 101. Pew Center on Global Climate Change has prepared detailed (and 
accessible) summaries of each bill.  PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PEW CTR. 
SUMMARY OF H.R. 2454: AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009 (WAXMAN-
MARKEY) (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Waxman-Markey%20
summary_FINAL_7.31.pdf; PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PEW CTR. SUMMARY 
OF CLEAN ENERGY JOBS AND AMERICAN POWER ACT (KERRY-BOXER) (2009), 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Pew-summary-kerry-boxer-epw-detailed-11-
18-09.pdf.   
 102. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLEAN ENERGY JOBS AND AMERICAN  
POWER ACT 1 (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/chairmans-mark-kerry-
boxer-10-29-09.pdf  
 103. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 3(2) 
(2009). 
 104. American Clean Energy and Sec. Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
§ 703(a)(2) (2009). 
 105. Compare Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. 
§ 3 (2009), with American Clean Energy and Sec. Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
§ 703 (2009). 
 106. See JOHN LARSEN, WORLD RESOURCES INST., EMISSION REDUCTIONS UNDER CAP-
AND-TRADE PROPOSALS IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 2 (2009), 
http://pdf.wri.org/usclimatetargets_2009-12-17.pdf. 
 107. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AT A GLANCE: AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY 
AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at 2, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Waxman-
Markey-short-summary-revised-June26.pdf. 
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of the two billion total if domestic sources prove insufficient.108  
Additionally, the EPA would be responsible for determining which 
offset projects, including international offset projects, were eligible 
for credits under the federal program based on recommendations 
from an Offsets Integrity Advisory Board.109  Beginning in 2018, 1.25 
offset credits derived from international sources would have to be 
surrendered for each ton of emissions compliance, while domestic 
offsets would not be subject to the increase and would retain their 1:1 
ratio.110  Although the Kerry-Boxer bill mirrors the House’s two-
billion-ton offset cap, it limits credits derived from international 
sources to 500 million tons (i.e., one quarter); however, if domestic 
sources are inadequate, the bill allows another 750 million tons to be 
derived from international sources, for a total of 1.25 billion of the 
two-billion ton total.111  The proposals are both explicitly designed for 
compatibility with REDD+.   
Under both proposals, the EPA is given the ultimate discretion to 
determine which offset projects, both domestically and international-
ly, meet the federal standards to ensure the verifiability, additionality, 
and permanence of the projects and are therefore eligible for 
receiving federal allowances.112  Waxman-Markey would also create a 
regulatory body within the EPA that would periodically review and 
approve all projects being used to offset emissions.113 
If implemented as passed by the House, Waxman-Markey could 
have a significant impact on tropical forest mitigation projects.  As 
much as forty-three percent of total reductions required by 2020 
under the bill could come from avoiding tropical deforestation, which 
would be supported by a more than one hundred-fold increase in U.S. 
funding for such projects.114  If the U.S. moves forward to this level of 
interface with tropical forest protection (which would offer significant 
cost reductions for U.S. domestic industries), the domestic law 
establishing the terms of investment—both public and private—may 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AT A GLANCE: CLEAN ENERGY JOBS AND 
AM. POWER ACT 2 (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/short-summary-
kerry-boxer-epw-committee-11-05-09.pdf. 
 112. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AT A GLANCE: AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY 
AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, supra note 107, at 2. 
 113. Id. 
 114. COMM’N ON CLIMATE AND TROPICAL FORESTS, PROTECTING THE CLIMATE 
FORESTS 45 (2009), http://www.climateforestscommission.org/documents/cctf-
report.pdf.  
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have a significant influence on the shape of projects designed to 
reduce tropical deforestation.115 
B. Advancing Sustainable Development Through U.S. Forest Offset Law  
The U.S. is the second largest GHG-emitter in the world, second 
only (and only recently) to China,116 at approximately seven billion 
tons117 (roughly twenty percent of global GHG emissions).  The 
proposed legislation described above would allow approximately 
twenty percent of total reductions by 2050 to be satisfied through 
purchases of EPA-approved, internationally generated carbon offset 
credits.  Although many credits will likely come from non-forestry 
sources, the volume of anticipated purchases by U.S. firms may 
provide an opportunity for U.S. law to significantly influence the types 
of offset projects that are created.  The volume of international credits 
permitted under the proposal is roughly 1000 times the total emis-
sions reductions of the well-known Noel Kempff Action Project 
discussed above, for example.118  Thus, even if U.S. entities turn to 
REDD+ for only one-quarter of the internationally-generated offsets 
allowed, they could still support approximately 250 projects the size of 
NKCAP. 
A recent report by the high-level expert group, the Commission 
on Climate and Tropical Forests (CCTF), strongly recommends U.S. 
policy and financial support for forest mitigation measures that 
support sustainable development and biodiversity preservation.119  The 
report notes the importance of capacity building to enable project 
development suitable for private investment, as well as public funding 
for REDD+ projects in high-risk areas (including many African 
nations) that contain important tropical forest assets but are unlikely 
to attract significant private investment.120   
As suggested by the CCTF report, carefully structured domestic 
U.S. law is essential to providing the appropriate incentives and 
 
 115. Id. at 47. 
 116. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS BY 
GAS, http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/facts_and_figures/us_emissions/ 
usghgemgas.cfm (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
 117. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSONS AND 
SINKS: 1990–2007, at 27 (2009), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ down-
loads09/GHG2007entire_report-508.pdf. 
 118. STRECK ET AL., supra note 39, at 223 (noting that NKCAP was certified to 
prevent approximately one million metric tons of emissions). 
 119. COMM’N ON CLIMATE AND TROPICAL FORESTS, supra note 114, at 51.  
 120. Id. at 49. 
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signals to support development of projects providing adequate 
environmental and socioeconomic protections.121  This can be 
achieved through legislative and/or regulatory requirements for 
determining qualifications of REDD+ projects for use as offsets in 
compliance with domestic U.S. law. 
Climate legislation should therefore require (or at a minimum 
permit) the EPA to establish a priority system for availability of 
international offset credits based on environmental and socioeconom-
ic benefits, once threshold requirements for mitigation assurances are 
met.  The EPA should establish a floor of “do-no-harm” requirements 
that prohibit use of REDD+ projects that are detrimental to primary 
forests or premised upon exclusion of indigenous peoples from 
traditional forest areas.  Beyond the floor, the EPA should establish a 
tiered system of REDD+ credits that would require purchase of credits 
from projects that meet a high level of environmental and socioeco-
nomic co-benefits, but allow lower-tiered REDD+ credits where high 
co-benefit level credits are not available.  Thus, this system would 
require the establishment of criteria for three categories of projects: 
(1) preferred high co-benefit projects as the primary credit type; (2) 
acceptable projects, from which credits could be purchased upon 
demonstration that high co-benefit project credits are not available 
for a reasonable price; and (3) impermissible credits, which would not 
be accepted as offsets for purposes of federal compliance.122  
The category of preferred REDD+ projects should require that 
tropical forest mitigation projects provide for maintenance of globally 
significant biodiversity, protection of regionally significant environ-
mental services, support of adaptation in the project region, or direct 
contribution to the maintenance of ecosystem services of special 
significance to peoples in the immediate project region (such as 
freshwater).  In addition, the EPA should provide for a verification 
protocol to enable demonstration of the project’s co-benefits.   
Projects providing high biodiversity co-benefits could, for exam-
ple, provide for conservation of identified biodiversity priority areas 
(such as areas with high numbers of endemic species and high risk of 
 
 121. Id. at 8. 
 122. In addition, legislation should provide for direct public funding of REDD+ 
projects in areas unsuitable for private investment.  The credits generated from such 
projects should then be deposited into a strategic reserve (as envisioned by Waxman-
Markey, for example), PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AT A GLANCE: AMERICAN 
CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, supra note 112, at 2, or used to provide 
additional allowances as necessary to temporarily reduce economic hardship, for 
example. 
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habitat destruction), or significantly enhance the viability of severely 
threatened species through reforestation that constitutes habitat 
restoration.  High-value ecosystem services protection, such as forest 
preservation that protects important water purification or precipita-
tion regulation services, could also qualify as projects with high co-
benefits levels.  High socioeconomic co-benefits could include 
projects that establish sustainable livelihoods as an alternative to 
forest-degrading economic activity or as a means of poverty allevia-
tion.  In addition, projects that include significant governance 
improvements, such as an effective increase in community manage-
ment of sustainably managed forests, could qualify as high co-benefit 
projects. 
Upon application by the purchaser or the project host, the EPA 
would be required to determine whether the application demon-
strates a high co-benefit value in one of the categories described 
above.123  In essence, nearly all EPA-approved international offsets 
should fall within this category.  In particular, projects sponsored by 
U.S. entities should be required to come within this category except 
upon demonstration that suitable projects cannot be found, which 
will presumably be a  rare circumstance (at least in the early years of 
the program).   
Although projects would not necessarily need to provide high 
levels of multiple types of co-benefits, projects in the preferred 
category should not degrade one type of co-benefit for the benefit of 
another type.  For example, a project that protects biodiversity by 
excluding forest-dependent peoples from traditionally important 
forest resources generally should not qualify as a high co-benefit 
project receiving EPA endorsement. 
Where high co-benefit level project credits are unavailable for a 
reasonable price (for example, a price lower than estimated direct 
compliance), the EPA should have a protocol for verifying that 
projects will not cause significant harm to environmental services or 
socioeconomic needs of the area.  Thus, for example, reforestation 
projects—even plantations—with little environmental or socioeco-
nomic significance could be approved, provided they are demonstra-
bly not replacing or otherwise displacing forests or other ecosystems 
of significant environmental or socioeconomic value. 
As an alternative to directly verifying co-benefit value, the EPA 
 
 123. Applications by investors should be reviewable based on project plans to 
support investment in projects providing this high level of benefit.   
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could accept projects certified under specific protocols, such as the 
CCB standards.  This would require an EPA determination that 
project compliance with the specific certification regime require-
ments equates to compliance with the regulatory criteria established 
for direct agency verification.   
If this framework, or a similar approach, is adopted as a mandate 
under climate change legislation otherwise approximating (or 
improving upon) the contours of the Waxman-Markey or the Kerry-
Boxer bill, the U.S. carbon offset market could become a force that 
drives significant progress on tropical deforestation issues.  In this 
way, the climate legislation would advance sustainable development 
and help to prevent the risks associated with a market-based REDD+ 
system from becoming reality.  Thus, U.S. domestic law could help 
transform REDD+ from a potentially risky mitigation mechanism into 
a force for holistic and sustainable improvement in tropical forest 
ecosystems, while simultaneously reducing compliance costs for 
domestic entities. 
V. CONCLUSION  
The development of tropical forest mitigation projects holds 
great promise for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and the threat 
of climate change.  It also has the potential to reverse decades of 
destructive deforestation and provide significant benefits for globally 
important environmental assets, such as biodiversity, and the multi-
tude of regional and local environmental and socioeconomic values of 
the forests.   
Both the design and implementation of REDD+ will determine 
whether the mechanism’s promise will be realized.  Without proper 
incentives, the infusion of finances into tropical forest countries could 
exacerbate existing problems and incentivize unsustainable forest 
practices in the name of carbon emissions reductions.124 
As discussed above, the U.S. is poised to enter the arena of glo-
bally significant national climate change law with several bills 
beginning to show the contours that such legislation may take.  Upon 
passage of legislation, the task of defining acceptable carbon offset 
credits from international sources will likely fall to the EPA.125  This 
provides a nearly unprecedented opportunity for U.S. regulation to 
 
 124. COMM’N ON CLIMATE AND TROPICAL FORESTS, supra note 114, at 51. 
 125. See, e.g., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PEW CENTER SUMMARY OF 
CLEAN ENERGY JOBS AND AMERICAN POWER ACT, supra note 101, at 11. 
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have a profound positive impact on the seemingly intractable 
problems of tropical deforestation. 
The EPA should seize this opportunity when it arrives by design-
ing a regulatory framework that promotes a broad array of benefits 
from tropical forest mitigation projects.  Specifically, the agency 
should define acceptable offset credits in terms of both the verifiabili-
ty of their mitigation value and their impact on other environmental 
and socioeconomic issues. Viewed in this light, passage of climate 
legislation would thus provide the United States a rare and critically 
important opportunity to advance the sustainable protection and 
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